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ABSTRACT
John Bell showed that a big class of local hidden-variable models stands in conflict with
quantum mechanics and experiment. Recently, there were suggestions that empirically
adequate hidden-variable models might exist which presuppose a weaker notion of local
causality. We will show that a Bell-type inequality can be derived also from these weaker
assumptions.
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1 Introduction
The violation of Bell’s inequality by the outcome of an EPR-type spin experi-
ment (Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen [1935]; Bohm [1951]) seems to exclude a
local theory with hidden variables. The underlying reductio ad absurdum
proof infers on the grounds of the empirical falsification of the derived
inequality that at least one of the required assumptions must be false. The
force of the argument requires that the derivation be deductive and that all
assumptions be explicit. We aim to extract a minimal set of assumptions
needed for a deductive derivation of Bell’s inequalities given perfect correla-
tion of outcomes of an EPR-type spin experiment with parallel settings.
One of the assumptions in Bell’s original derivation (Bell [1964]) was
determinism. Later, he succeeded in deriving a similar inequality without
determinism (Bell [1971]), placing in its stead an assumption later dubbed
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local causality (Bell [1975]). As Bell stressed, the notion of local causality he
and others used might be challenged. In Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei, and Szabo´
([1999]), it was pointed out that Reichenbach’s Common Cause Principle
(Reichenbach [1956]) indeed suggests a weaker form of local causality. We
will prove here, however, that even from this weaker notion Bell’s inequality
can still be derived.1
2 The EPR–Bohm experiment
Consider the so-called EPR–Bohm (EPRB) experiment (Einstein, Podolsky,
and Rosen [1935]; Bohm [1951]). Two spin-1
2
particles in the singlet state
jCi ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p j "#i j #"ið Þ ð1Þ
are separated in such a way that one particle moves to a measurement appar-
atus in the left wing of the experimental setting and the other particle to a
measurement apparatus in the right wing (see Figure 1). The experimenter
can choose arbitrarily one of three directions in which the spin is measured
with a Stern–Gerlach magnet.
The following terminology follows the reconstruction of Wigner ([1970]),
which van Fraassen ([1989]) has subsequently expanded on. The event type2
that the left (right) measurement apparatus is set to measure the spin in dir-
ection i 2 {1,2,3} is symbolized by Li (Ri). Lai (Rai ) symbolizes the event type
that the measurement outcome in the left (right) wing of a spin measurement
in direction i is a. There are two possible measurement outcomes spin up
(a ¼ þ) and spin down (a ¼ ) for each particle in each direction. The letter
j 2 {1, 2, 3} will be used like i to symbolize directions and b 2 {þ,} like a to
symbolize measurement outcomes. Formulae in which the variables i, j, a,
and b appear are meant to hold—if not otherwise stated—for all possible
Figure 1. Setup of the EPR–Bohm experiment (cf. Bell [1987], p. 140).
1 Several of the issues we present in this paper are discussed in more detail in Wu¨thrich ([2003]).
2 We will speak of event types to distinguish them from the token events which instantiate
corresponding event types.
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values of the variables. p(X) denotes the probability of an event type X, which
is empirically measurable as the relative frequency of all runs of an EPRB
experiment in which the event type X is instantiated, with respect to all runs.
p(X ^ Y) is the probability of the event type ‘X and Y ’, measurable as the
relative frequency of all runs in which both X and Y are instantiated. p(X |Y )¼
p(X ^ Y)/p(Y) is the conditional probability of the event type X given the
event type Y, measurable as the relative frequency of instantiations of X
with respect to the subensemble of all runs in which Y is instantiated. For
example,
pðLai ^ Rbj jLi ^ RjÞ ð2Þ
denotes the probability that the measurement outcome is a on the left and b
on the right when measuring in direction i on the left and in direction j on the
right. These probabilities are predicted by quantum mechanics as
pðLþi ^ Rþj jLi ^ RjÞ ¼
1
2
sin2
wij
2
, ð3Þ
pðLi ^ Rj jLi ^ RjÞ ¼
1
2
sin2
wij
2
, ð4Þ
pðLþi ^ Rj jLi ^ RjÞ ¼
1
2
cos2
wij
2
, ð5Þ
pðLi ^ Rþj jLi ^ RjÞ ¼
1
2
cos2
wij
2
, ð6Þ
where wij denotes the angle between the two measurement directions i and j.
Also, the outcomes on each side are predicted separately to be completely
random:
p Lai jLi ^ Rj
  ¼ 1
2
, ð7Þ
pðRbj jLi ^ RjÞ ¼
1
2
: ð8Þ
3 Local causality
The derivations of Bell-type inequalities known to us which do not presuppose
determinism assume instead what John Bell calls local causality (Bell [1975];
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Clauser and Horne [1974]), that is, the assumption that there is a common
cause variable3 V which takes on values q 2 I ¼ {q1, q2, q3, . . ., qk} such that
for event types ‘the variable V has the value q’ (Vq) we have
P
q p(Vq) ¼ 1 and
pðLai ^ Rbj jVq ^ Li ^ RjÞ ¼ pðLai jVq ^ LiÞ pðRbj jVq ^ RjÞ: ð9Þ
Other frequently used names for this condition are factorizability (Butterfield
[1989]) and strong locality (Jarrett [1984], [1989]). It is usually justified by
pointing out that it follows from the conjunction of the following three
conditions, which are called completeness [Equation (10)] and locality
[Equations (11) and (12)] (Jarrett [1984], [1989]), outcome independence and
parameter independence (Shimony [1993]), or causality and hidden locality
(van Fraassen [1989]):
pðLai ^ Rbj jVq ^ Li ^ RjÞ ¼ pðLai jVq ^ Li ^ RjÞ pðRbj jVq ^ Li ^ RjÞ,
ð10Þ
pðLai jLi ^ Rj ^ VqÞ ¼ pðLai jLi ^ VqÞ, ð11Þ
pðRaj jLi ^ Rj ^ VqÞ ¼ pðRaj jRj ^ VqÞ: ð12Þ
Equation (10) says that event types Vq or the variable V ‘screens off ’ Lai and
Rbj from each other (van Fraassen [1989]; Butterfield [1989]). Van Fraassen
([1989]) pointed out that Equation (10) can be motivated through
Reichenbach’s Principle of Common Cause (PCC) (Reichenbach [1956]).
The principle states that whenever two different event types A and B are
statistically correlated
p A ^ Bð Þ 6¼ p Að Þp Bð Þ ð13Þ
and neither is A causally relevant for B nor B for A, there exists a common
cause variable V with values q 2 I ¼ {q1, q2, q3,. . . , qk} (
P
q p(Vq) ¼ 1) such
that A and B given Vq are uncorrelated:
pðA ^ BjVqÞ ¼ pðAjVqÞpðBjVqÞ: ð14Þ
In its original formulation the principle is stated only for a common cause
event type C, which is included in our formulation as the special case where
Vq can take only two values: Vq1 ¼ C, Vq2 ¼ :C (‘not C’). The principle has
been formulated for general common cause variables by Hofer-Szabo´ and
3 For the sake of simplicity, we assume that this partition is discrete and finite. As will become
clear in the following, the derivation of Bell’s inequality can also be done without this restriction.
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Re´dei ([2004]) and Placek ([2000]). Besides the screening-off condition,
Reichenbach ([1956]) and Hofer-Szabo´ and Re´dei ([2004]) stipulate further
restrictions on the common cause variable, which are, however, irrelevant for
our purposes.
Now, as can be seen from Equations (3)–(6), the event type Lai is in general
correlated with event type Rbj . It is
pðLai jLi ^ RjÞ ¼ pðRbj jLi ^ RjÞ ¼
1
2
, ð15Þ
and therefore
pðLai ^ Rbj jLi ^ RjÞ 6¼ pðLai jLi ^ RjÞpðRbj jLi ^ RjÞ
except for wij ¼
p
2
mod p: ð16Þ
Supposing that Lai is not causally relevant for R
b
j and vice versa (which is
reinforced by the fact that the setup of the experiment can be chosen so that
the instantiations of Lai and R
b
j in each run of the experiment are space-
like separated), PCC requires a common cause variable which fulfills
Equation (10). There are several different correlations; for example, Lþ1 is
correlated with Rþ2 , and L
þ
2 is correlated with R
þ
3 . For each of these correla-
tions PCC enforces the consequence that a common cause variable exists. As
stressed in Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei, and Szabo´ ([1999]) nothing in PCC dictates
that the common cause variables of the different correlations have to be the
same. However, in all the derivations of Bell’s inequality known to us this
identification is made nevertheless. It is further shown in Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei,
and Szabo´ ([1999]) and Hofer-Szabo´ and Re´dei ([2004]) that for any set of
correlations it is mathematically possible to construct common cause vari-
ables. The authors concluded in Hofer-Szabo´, Re´dei, and Szabo´ ([1999]) that
the apparent contradiction between this possibility and the claim that the
EPRB correlations do not allow for a common cause variable (van
Fraassen [1989]; Butterfield [1989]) is resolved by pointing out that in
the derivation of Bell’s inequality a common common cause variable for all
measurements is assumed:
The crucial assumption in the [. . .] derivation of the [Clauser–Horne]
inequality is that [the two-valued common cause variable] is a [two-
valued common cause variable] for all four correlated pairs, i.e. that
[Vq] is a common common cause [variable], shared by different correla-
tions. Without this assumption Bell’s inequality cannot be derived. But
there does not seem to be any obvious reason why common causes should
also be common common causes, whether of quantum or of any other sort
of correlations. (Italics in the original)
Showing the mathematical possibility of constructing common cause vari-
ables for any set of correlations and in particular for the correlations found in
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the EPRB experiment is not sufficient for proving the existence of a physically
‘natural’ hidden-variable model for that experiment, however. Besides being
common cause variables [thus fulfilling Equation (10)], parameter independ-
ence should hold, too [Equations (11) and (12)]. Also, they should not be
correlated with the measurement choices. As shown by Szabo´ ([1998]), it is
possible to construct a model which fulfils these requirements for each of the
common cause variables separately. However, the conjunctions and other
logical combinations of the event types that the common cause variables
have certain values correlate in that model with the measurement operations.
Whether a model can be constructed without these correlations was posed as
an open question by Szabo´. This question is answered negatively by the
derivation of Bell’s inequality that we present in the remainder of this article.
4 Bell’s inequality from separate common causes
4.1 A weak screening-off principle
Consider an EPRB experiment where the same direction i (i 2 {1,2,3}) is
chosen in both wings. That is, in each run the event type Li ^ Ri is instanti-
ated. With this special setting quantum mechanics predicts [see Equations (3)–
(8), with wij¼ 0] that the measurement outcomes in each wing are random but
that the outcomes in one wing are perfectly correlated with the outcomes in
the other wing: if and only if the spin of the left particle is up, then the spin of
the right particle is down, and vice versa. We refer to this assumption as
perfect correlation, or PCORR for short.
Assumption 1 (PCORR)
pii R

i jLþi
  ¼ 1 and pii Lþi jRi
  ¼ 1: ð17Þ
We use here the definition
pij . . .ð Þ(p . . . jLi ^ Rj
 
: ð18Þ
Large spatial separation of coinciding events of type Lai and R
b
j suggests
that the respective instances are indeed distinct events. This excludes an
explanation of the correlations by event identity, as is the case, for example,
with a tossed coin for the perfect correlation of the event types ‘heads up’ and
‘tails down’. Such a perfect correlation is explained in that every instance of
‘heads up’ is also an instance of ‘tails down’, and vice versa. Since the sep-
aration is even space-like, no Lai or R
b
j should be causally relevant for the
other. We refer to these two assumptions as separability, SEP for short, and
locality 1 (LOC1).
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Assumption 2 (SEP) The coinciding instances of Lai and R
b
j are distinct events.
Assumption 3 (LOC1) No Lai or R
b
j is causally relevant for the other.
Rather, there should be a common cause variable; that is, we assume PCC.
Assumption 4 (PCC) If two event types A and B are correlated and the correla-
tion cannot be explained by direct causation nor by event identity, then there
exists a common cause variable V, with values q 2 I ¼ {q1, q2, q3, . . . , qk} such
that
P
qp(Vq) ¼ 1 and p(A ^ B |Vq) ¼ p(A |Vq)p(B |Vq), 8q.
As already mentioned, we omit the other Reichenbachian conditions
(Reichenbach [1956]; Hofer-Szabo´ and Re´dei [2004]) since they are not
necessary for our derivation.
This principle, together with the assumptions PCORR, SEP, and LOC1,
implies that there is for each of the EPRB correlations a (possibly different)
common cause variable Vþij with q 2 Iþij . The sub- and superscripts in Vþij
with q 2 Iþij refer to Vþij being a common cause variable of Lþi and Rj .
Result 1
pii L
þ
i ^ Ri jVþii q
  ¼ pii Lþi jVþii q
 
pii R

i jVþii q
 
: ð19Þ
Note that common cause variables can be different for different
correlations.
4.2 Perfect correlation and ‘determinism’
We now show that from the fact that a perfect correlation is screened off by
some variable it follows that without loss of generality the common cause
variable can be assumed to be two-valued and that the having of one of the
two values of the variables is necessary and sufficient for the instantiation of
the two perfectly correlated event types, cf. Suppes and Zanotti ([1976]).
Let A and B be perfectly correlated,
p A jBð Þ ¼ p B jAð Þ ¼ 1,
and screened-off from each other by a common cause variable,
p A ^ B jVqð Þ ¼ p A jVqð Þp B jVqð Þ:
We can split the set I of all values V completely into two disjoint subsets,
namely into the subset Iþ of those values of V for which p(A ^ Vq) is not zero
and into the subset I of those for which it is zero:
Iþ ¼ fq 2 I : p A ^ Vqð Þ 6¼ 0g,
I ¼ fq 2 I : p A ^ Vqð Þ ¼ 0g,
I ¼ I [ Iþ, I \ Iþ ¼ ;:
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From this definition of I it follows already that
p A jVqð Þ ¼ 0, 8q 2 I, ð20Þ
that is, that Vq with q 2 Iþ is necessary for A. Moreover, for all q 2 Iþ we
have by screening-off and perfect correlation
p A jVqð Þ ¼ p A jB ^ Vqð Þ ¼ 1: ð21Þ
That the variable V has a value in Iþ is a necessary and sufficient condition
for A. The following calculation shows that Vq with q 2 Iþ is also necessary
and sufficient for B.
From perfect correlation it follows that
p B jA ^ Vqð Þ ¼ 1, 8q 2 Iþ:
That Vq screens off B from A yields
p B jA ^ Vqð Þ ¼ p B jVqð Þ:
Together with the previous equation this implies that Vq is sufficient for B
for all q 2 Iþ:
p B jVqð Þ ¼ 1, 8q 2 Iþ: ð22Þ
If q2 I we have by definition p(A ^ Vq) ¼ 0, which implies
p A ^ B ^ Vqð Þ ¼ 0:
By perfect correlation we therefore also have p(B ^ Vq) ¼ 0, which in turn
implies that
p B jVqð Þ ¼ 0, 8q 2 I, ð23Þ
which means that Vq with q 2 Iþ is also necessary for B.
This calculation shows that in the case of a perfect correlation the set of
values of the common cause variable decomposes into two relevant sets. This
means that whenever there is an (arbitrarily valued) common cause variable
for a perfect correlation, there is also a two-valued common cause variable,
namely, the disjunction of all event types Vq for which q2 Iþ or q 2 I,
respectively.
C ¼ _q2IþVq,
:C ¼ _q2IVq:
We refer to C as a common cause event type. In the case of a perfect cor-
relation no generality is achieved by allowing for a more than two-valued
common cause variable; if there is a common cause variable for a perfect
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correlation, there is also a common cause event type. Moreover, the common
cause event type is a necessary and sufficient condition for the event types
that are screened off by it [Equations (20)–(23)]. Result 1 thus implies that
there is a common cause event type Cþii such that
pii L
þ
i jCþii
  ¼ pii Ri jCþii
  ¼ 1, ð24Þ
pii L
þ
i j :Cþii
  ¼ pii Ri j :Cþii
  ¼ 0: ð25Þ
The sub- and superscripts of Cþii refer to C
þ
ii being the common cause
event type of Lþi and R

i .
The outcome of a spin measurement is always either þ or  and
nothing else. We call this assumption exactly one of exactly two possible
outcomes (EX).
Assumption 5 (EX)
pii L
þ
i
 þ pii Li
  ¼ 1, pii Lþi ^ Li
  ¼ 0, ð26Þ
pii R
þ
i
 þ pii Ri
  ¼ 1, pii Rþi ^ Ri
  ¼ 0: ð27Þ
As stressed by Fine ([1982]), among the actual measurements there are always
runs in which no outcome is registered, which is normally attributed to the
limited efficiency of the detectors and not taken to the statistics. If one
assumes, instead, that part of these no-outcome runs are caused by the
hidden variable, then it is possible to construct empirically adequate models
for the EPRB experiments (Szabo´ [2000]; Szabo´ and Fine [2002]). With
Assumption 5, we explicitly exclude such models.
With Assumption 5, while Cþii is necessary and sufficient for L
þ
i and R

i ,
its complement, :Cþii , is necessary and sufficient for the opposite outcomes,
namely, Li and R
þ
i :
pii L

i jCþii
  ¼ pii Rþi jCþii
  ¼ 0, ð28Þ
pii L

i j :Cþii
  ¼ pii Rþi j :Cþii
  ¼ 1: ð29Þ
4.3 A minimal theory for spins
In Section 4.2 it was found that Cþii is sufficient for L
þ
i given parallel settings
(Li ^ Ri) [see Equation (24)]. That is, the conjunction Cþii ^ Li ^ Ri is suffi-
cient for Lþi . But because of space-like separation of events of type L
þ
i and Ri
that are instantiated in the same run, the latter types should not be causally
relevant for the former. The measurement choice in one wing should be caus-
ally irrelevant for the outcomes (and the choices) in the other wing. Therefore
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we should discard Ri from the sufficient conjunction. The part C
þ
ii ^ Li alone
is sufficient for Lþi . A similar reasoning can be applied to R
þ
j , Rj, and :Cþjj
[cf. Equation (29)]. This is our assumption locality 2 (LOC2).
Assumption 6 (LOC2) If Li ^ Ri ^ X is sufficient for Lþi , then Li ^ X alone is
sufficient for Lþi , and similarly for R
þ
j , that is, if Lj ^ Rj ^ Y is sufficient for
Rþj , then Rj ^ Y alone is sufficient for Rþj .
Moreover, the remaining part Cþii ^ Li is minimally sufficient, in the sense
that none of its parts is sufficient on its own.4 If, for example, Cþ11 is instan-
tiated but we do not choose to measure L1, then L
þ
1 will not be instantiated.
That is to say, we cannot discard yet another conjunct of Li ^ Cþii as we
discarded Ri from C
þ
ii ^ Li ^ Ri.
Let us turn to necessary conditions for Lþi . To begin with, Li is necessary: if
there is no Stern–Gerlach magnet properly set up (Li) the particle is not
deflected either up- or downwards; similarly for Li , R
þ
j , and R

j . Roughly
speaking, no outcome without measurement (NOWM).
Assumption 7 (NOWM)
p Lþi ^ :Li
  ¼ 0, p Li ^ :Li
  ¼ 0, ð30Þ
pðRþj ^ :RjÞ ¼ 0, pðRj ^ :RjÞ ¼ 0: ð31Þ
Second, we saw in Section 4.2 that if parallel settings are chosen and
:Cþii is instantiated an event of type Lþi never occurs. In other words,
:Cþii ^ Li ^ Ri implies :Lþi :
:Cþii ^ Li ^ Ri!:Lþi : ð32Þ
Again we propose a locality condition based on the idea that the measure-
ment choice in one wing should be causally irrelevant for the outcomes (and
the choices) in the other wing:5 if :Cþii ^ Li ^ Ri is sufficient for :Lþi , then
:Cþii ^ Li alone should be sufficient for :Lþi . A similar reasoning can be
applied to Rþj , Rj, and C
þ
jj [cf. Equation (28)].
Assumption 8 (LOC3) If Li ^ Ri ^ X is sufficient for :Lþi , then Li ^ X alone is
sufficient for :Lþi , and similarly for :Rþj , that is, if Lj ^ Rj ^ Y is sufficient for
:Rþj , then Rj ^ Y alone is sufficient for :Rþj .
4 Minimal sufficient conditions as defined by Graßhoff and May ([2001]) and Baumgartner and
Graßhoff ([2004]).
5 The following version of LOC3 is slightly different from that in an earlier version of the article.
We thank Gabor Hofer-Szabo´, Miklo´s Re´dei, and In˜aki San Pedro for their comments.
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By LOC3 it follows from Equation (32) that
:Cþii ^ Li!:Lþi : ð33Þ
This is equivalent to
Lþi ^ Li!Cþii , ð34Þ
and also to
Lþi ^ Li!Cþii ^ Li: ð35Þ
According to Equation (30), Li is necessary for L
þ
i . That means L
þ
i !Li, but
also Lþi !Lþi ^ Li. We have found [Equation (35)] that Lþi ^ Li!Cþii ^ Li.
Altogether, this entails Lþi !Li ^ Cþii , that is, that Li ^ Cþii is necessary for
Lþi . Moreover, it is a minimally necessary condition in the sense of Graßhoff
and May ([2001]) since it does not contain any disjuncts. All in all, Cþii ^ Li
is a minimally necessary and minimally sufficient condition for Lþi . In a sim-
ilar vein we find that Rj ^ :Cþjj is minimally necessary and minimally suffi-
cient for Rþj . We have thus derived in particular the four minimal theories in
the sense of Graßhoff and May ([2001]), as illustrated in Figure 2.
In a formal notation the four minimal theories read as the following four
equations, where $ is the usual biconditional, which means that the left-hand
side implies the right-hand side and vice versa.6 This intermediate result is
referred to as minimal theories (MTH).
Result 2 (MTH)
L1 ^ Cþ11
 $ Lþ1 , ð2aÞ
L2 ^ Cþ22
 $ Lþ2 , ð2bÞ
R2 ^ :Cþ22
 $ Rþ2 , ð2cÞ
R3 ^ :Cþ33
 $ Rþ3 : ð2dÞ
From the logical relations (2a), (2b), (2c) and (2d) the following probabil-
ities can be derived:
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2
  ¼ p L1 ^ Cþ11 ^ R2 ^ :Cþ22
 
,
p Lþ2 ^ Rþ3
  ¼ p L2 ^ Cþ22 ^ R3 ^ :Cþ33
 
,
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ3
  ¼ p L1 ^ Cþ11 ^ R3 ^ :Cþ33
 
:
6 For details see Graßhoff and May ([2001]) and Baumgartner and Graßhoff ([2004]). Note in
particular that a correct formal notation of a minimal theory uses what both call a double
conditional.
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By NOWM [Equations (30) and (31)] p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2
 
is the same as p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2 ^

L1 ^ R2Þ and so on, and the above equations read
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2 ^ L1 ^ R2
  ¼ p L1 ^ Cþ11 ^ R2 ^ :Cþ22
 
, ð36Þ
p Lþ2 ^ Rþ3 ^ L2 ^ R3
  ¼ p L2 ^ Cþ22 ^ R3 ^ :Cþ33
 
, ð37Þ
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ3 ^ L1 ^ R3
  ¼ p L1 ^ Cþ11 ^ R3 ^ :Cþ33
 
: ð38Þ
4.4 No conspiracy
The events of type Cþii are not supposed to be influenced by the measuring
operations Li and Rj. One reason for this assumption is that the measurement
operations can be chosen arbitrarily before the particles enter the magnetic
field of the Stern–Gerlach magnets and that an event of type Cþii is assumed
to happen before the particles arrive at the magnets. Therefore a causal influ-
ence of the measurement operations on events of type Cþii would be tanta-
mount to backward causation. Also an inverse statement is supposed to hold:
the event types Cþii are assumed not to be causally relevant for the measure-
ment operations. This is meant to rule out some kind of ‘cosmic conspiracy’
that whenever an event of type Cþii is instantiated, the experimenter would
be ‘forced’ to use certain measurement operations. This causal independence
between Cþii and the measurement operations is assumed to imply the cor-
responding statistical independence. The same is assumed to hold also for
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
Figure 2. Minimal theories for outcomes of spin measurements according to
result 2 (MTH).
674 G. Graßhoff et al.
conjunctions of common cause event types. We refer to this condition as no
conspiracy (NO-CONS).
Assumption 9 (NO-CONS)
pðCþii ^ :Cþjj jLi ^ RjÞ ¼ pðCþii ^ :Cþjj Þ: ð39Þ
By this condition of statistical independence the three probabilities con-
sidered above can be transformed. That is, we have, for instance
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2 jL1 ^ R2
 
(
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2 ^ L1 ^ R2
 
p L1 ^ R2ð Þ
ðiÞ
¼
p L1 ^ Cþ11 ^ R2 ^ :Cþ22
 
p L1 ^ R2ð Þ
( p Cþ11 ^ :Cþ22 jL1 ^ R2
 
ðiiÞ
¼ p C
þ
11 ^ :Cþ22
 
ðiiiÞ
¼ p C
þ
11 ^ :Cþ22 ^ Cþ33
 
þ p Cþ11 ^ :Cþ22 ^ :Cþ33
 
:
The dotted equations are true by definition of conditional probability.
In step (i), Equation (36) was used. Step (ii) is valid by ‘no conspiracy’
[Equation (39)] and (iii) by a theorem of probability calculus, according to
which p(A) ¼ p(A ^ B) þ p(A ^ :B) for any A and B. Transforming the other
two expressions in a similar way, we arrive at
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2 jL1 ^ R2
  ¼ p Cþ11 ^ :Cþ22 ^ Cþ33
 
þ p Cþ11 ^ :Cþ22 ^ :Cþ33
 
, ð40Þ
p Lþ2 ^ Rþ3 jL2 ^ R3
  ¼ p Cþ11 ^ Cþ22 ^ :Cþ33
 
þ p :Cþ11 ^ Cþ22 ^ :Cþ33
 
, ð41Þ
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ3 jL1 ^ R3
  ¼ p Cþ11 ^ Cþ22 ^ :Cþ33
 
þ p Cþ11 ^ :Cþ22 ^ :Cþ33
 
: ð42Þ
Since both terms on the right-hand side of the last equation appear in the sum
of the right-hand sides of the first two equations, the following version of the
Bell inequality (BELL) follows.7
7 It was first derived in this form by Wigner ([1970]).
Minimal Assumption Derivation of a Bell-type Inequality 675
Result 3 (BELL)
p Lþ1 ^ Rþ3 jL1 ^ R3
   p Lþ1 ^ Rþ2 jL1 ^ R2
 
þ p Lþ2 ^ Rþ3 jL2 ^ R3
 
: ð43Þ
This inequality has been empirically falsified; see, for example, Aspect,
Dalibard, and Roger ([1982]).
The inequality was derived from the following assumptions:
 perfect correlation (PCORR)
 separability (SEP)
 locality 1 (LOC1)
 principle of common cause (PCC)
 exactly one of exactly two possible outcomes (EX)
 locality 2 (LOC2)
 no outcome without measurement (NOWM)
 locality 3 (LOC3)
 no conspiracy (NO-CONS)
This is a version of Bell’s theorem. It says: if these assumptions are true, the
Bell inequality is true. The derivation of the Bell inequality presented here is
an improvement on the usual Bell-type arguments, such as Bell ([1975]) and
van Fraassen ([1989]), in two respects. First, it does not assume a common
common cause variable for different correlations. Second, contrary to the
usual locality conditions, the ones assumed here do not presuppose a solution
to the problems posed by the relation between causal and statistical
(in)dependence (see e.g., Spirtes, Glymour, and Scheines [1993]).
5 Discussion
Our claim to have presented a minimal assumption derivation of a Bell-type
inequality is relative: our set of assumptions is weaker than any set known to
us from which a Bell-type inequality can be derived and that contains the
assumption of perfect correlation (PCORR). It was one of the achievements
of Clauser and Horne ([1974]) to show that a Bell-type inequality can be
derived also if the correlations of outcomes of parallel spin measurements
are not assumed to be perfect. Our assumption of correlation is stronger
than the one used by Clauser and Horne. However, they assume a common
common cause variable for all correlations, which is a stronger assumption
than our assumption of possibly different common cause variables for each
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correlation (PCC). We have not been able to derive a Bell-type inequality
ruling out perfect correlations and allowing different common cause
variables. If PCORR is indeed a necessary assumption for our derivation
of the Bell inequality, it should be possible to construct a model in which
PCORR does not hold (being violated by an arbitrary small deviation, say).
Since the actually measured correlations are never perfect—a fact that is
usually attributed to experimental imperfections—it is not obvious how
such a model could be refuted.
Our notion of local causality might be challenged as follows. Even
though nothing in PCC dictates that in general the common cause
variables of different correlations have to be the same, there might be strong
grounds for why they are the same in the context of the EPRB
experiment. Indeed, Bell argued for his choice of local causality along the
following lines.8
Assume that Lai and R
b
j are positively correlated. Then
pðLai jRbj ^ Li ^ RjÞ > pðLai jLi ^ RjÞ: ð44Þ
Since coinciding instances of Lai and R
b
j are space-like separated, neither is
causally relevant for the other. Rather, the correlation should be explained by
exhibiting some common causes in the overlap of the backward light cones of
the coinciding instances. An instance of, say, Lai raises the probability of an
instantiation of one of the common causally relevant factors, and this raises
the probability of an instantiation of Rbj . But given the total state of the
overlap of the backward light cones of two coinciding instances, the probab-
ility of, say, Rbj is assumed to be the same whether L
a
i is instantiated or not. If
the total state of the overlap of the backward light cones is already given,
nothing more that could be causally relevant for Rbj can be inferred from an
instance of Lai .
Along this line of reasoning the total state V of the overlap of the backward
light cones9 of Lai and R
b
j is a common cause variable which screens off the
correlation:
pðLai ^ Rbj jLi ^ Rj ^ VqÞ ¼ pðLai jLi ^ Rj ^ VqÞ
 pðRbj jLi ^ Rj ^ VqÞ: ð45Þ
8 For a very good and more detailed discussion of this, see Butterfield ([1989]).
9 One might argue that the total state of the union of the backward light cones is a better candidate
for a common cause variable (Butterfield [1989]). The following discussion carries over also to
this case.
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The common past Vq cannot be altered by choosing one or the other dir-
ection for the spin measurement—‘facta infecta fieri non possunt’ (Placek
[2000], p. 185). Therefore the total state Vq of the common past is indeed a
common common cause variable for all correlated outcomes; see Figure 3.
This reasoning can be questioned along the following lines. It is reasonable
that not all event types that are instantiated in the overlap of the backward
light cones of two coinciding instances of the correlated event types are caus-
ally relevant for these latter event types. Therefore conditionalizing on the
total state is conditionalizing not only on the relevant factors but also on the
irrelevant ones. Moreover, it is conceivable that which event types of the
common past are relevant and which are not differs for different measure-
ments. Claiming that the total state of the common past is a common com-
mon cause variable, one is thus committed to assume that
conditionalizing on all other events . . . in addition to those affecting [the
correlated event types], does not disrupt the stochastic independence
induced by conditionalizing on the affecting events (Butterfield [1989]).
In particular, in the light of Simpson’s paradox (Simpson [1951]) this assump-
tion has been challenged (Cartwright [1979]). Here, we will not assess argu-
ments in favour of or against the possibility that conditionalizing on
irrelevancies yields unexpected statistical dependencies. Our point is that by
weakening the assumption in the way we did, our derivation is conclusive
whatever may be the answer to this question.
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